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GLOBALIZING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
CONVERGENCE OF FORM OR FUNCTION

Ronald J. Gilson*

Globalization has led to a remarkable resurgence in the study of
comparative corporate governance. This area of scholarship had been
largely the domain of taxonomists, intent on cataloguing the central
characteristics of national corporate governance systems, and then
classifying different systems based on the specified attributes. The
result was an interesting, if perhaps somewhat dry, enterprise. We
learned that national corporate governance systems differed
dramatically along a number of seemingly important dimensions.
Some corporate governance systems, notably those of the United
States and other Anglo Saxon countries, are built on the foundation of
a stock market-centered capital market. Other systems, like those of
Germany and Japan, rest on a bank-centered capital market. Some
systems are characterized by large groupings of related corporations,
like the Japanese keiretsu, Korean chaebol, or European holding
company structures. Still others are notable for concentrated family
control of large businesses, including Canada, Italy and, notably,
Germany.1 Management styles also differ across national systems.
* Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford University, and Marc
and Eva Stern Professor of Law and Business, Columbia University. Earlier
versions of this paper were presented at the Symposium on Globalization and Law
for the Twentieth Century, sponsored by Seoul National University College of
Law, October 10-11th , 1997, and at the Sloan Foundation/Columbia Law School
Conference on Convergence in Corporate Governance, December 5, 1997. I am
grateful for the helpful comments of Jack Coffee, Ehud Kamar, Kon-Sik Kim, HwaJin Kim, Mark Roe, and Woong-Song Soon, and to Win Hwangbo for research
assistance.
1

Marco Becht & Ekkehart Boehmer, Ownership and Voting Power in Germany, in
The Control of Corporate Europe (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht, eds.),

1

In the United States and France, managerial power is concentrated, by
practice in the U.S. and with statutory support in France, in an
imperial-style American chief executive officer or French presidente
directeur generale.2
The explosive decompression of trade barriers that gave rise to
global competition also had an impact on academics. We learned that
the institutions of all national systems were shaped not only by
efficiency, but also by history and politics. In the United States, for
example, the limited role of financial institutions in corporate
governance – in effect, the Berle-Means separation of ownership and
control − was the artifact not just of economics, but also of populist
politics operating in a federal system.3
Similarly, lifetime
employment in Japan, said to be central to Japanese corporate
governance, reflected not an effort to encourage investment in worker
human capital, as commonly treated in the economics literature but,
rather, grew out of a post-World War II political deal intended to
rationalize work force levels and restore management control of
production.4
Once different national governance systems were understood as
more than just way stations on the road to convergence, comparative
scholars began to treat institutional differences as having competitive
consequences. Competition was not just between products, but also
between governance systems. For example, Masahiko Aoki argued
that Japanese lean production was inextricably linked to the Japanese
preliminary version, available at www.ecgn.ulb.ac.be/book/ (visited April 20,
2000); Julian Franks and Colin Mayer, Ownership, Control and the Performance of
German Corporations, Working Paper, Jan. 1997; Ekkehart Böehmer, Who
Controls Germany? An Exploratory Analysis (working paper, Univeritat Osnabrük
Arbeitspapiere Nr. 71, Oct. 15, 1998); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanos,
Andrei Shliefer & Robert Vishny, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54
J.Fin. 471 (1999)
2

CCH Int’l , French Law on Commercial Companies 5-6 (2d. ed. 1988).

3

Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners (1994); Miguel Cantillo Simon,
The Rise and Fall of Bank Control in the United States, 88 Am.Econ. Rev. 1077,
1078-79 (1998). Some scholars have taken issue with this “ political” theory. See
note 22 infra.
4

Ronald J. Gilson and Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the
Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99 Col. L. Rev. 508 (1999).
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governance system, in which main bank contingent monitoring and
cross-shareholdings protected the promise of lifetime employment by
shielding managers and workers from shareholder demands, but
disciplined both groups in the event of poor performance.5 Others
argued that the vertical keiretsu structure provided an important
means of mutual monitoring.6 Michael Porter argued that the bank
centered capital markets of Germany and Japan allowed executives to
manage in the long run while U.S. managers invested myopically out
of fear that, unless catered to by a sharp focus on quarter to quarter
earnings growth, the stock market’s fickleness would be enforced by
the market for corporate control.7
At the same time, other
commentators extolled the American system because its openness to
external monitoring through a stock market-centered capital market
allowed it to respond quickly to changes in the economic
environment.8 Finally, an important literature developed that ties the
distribution of shareholdings within a country and the nature of its
capital market to the quality of the country’s legal and governance
system.9 Whichever side of the issue one took, the corporate

5

See, e.g., Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 27
J.Econ. Lit. 1 (1990); Masahiko Aoki, The Japanese Firm as a System of
Attributes: A Survey and Research Agenda, in The Japanese Firm: The Sources of
Competitive Strength 11 (Masahiko Aoki & Ronald Dore eds. 1994).
6

Ronald J. Gilson and Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu:
Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 Yale L.J.
271 (1993); Eric Bergloff & Enrico Peroti, The Governance Structure of the
Japanese Financial Keiretsu, 36 J. Fin. Econ. 259 (1994).
7

Michael Porter, Capital Disadvantages: America’s Failing Capital Investment
System, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1992.
8

See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on
Harmonizing the European Corporate Governance Environment, 61 Fordham L.
Rev. 161 (1992); Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic
Efficiency: When do Institutions Matter?, 74 Wash. U.L.Q. 327 (1996).
9

See, e.g., La Porta,et. al., supra note 1; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanos, Andrei Shliefer & Robert Vishny, Legal Determinants of Outside Finance,
52 J. Fin. 1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanos, Andrei
Shliefer & Robert Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J.Pol. Econ. 1113 (1998); Rafael
LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanos, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor
Protection and Corporate Governance (working paper, Oct. 1999). This paper is
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governance debate came to turn on arguments about the link between
particular national governance institutions and competitiveness: Is this
institution efficient?
From this point, it was no great leap to predictions of convergence:
The force of competition would lead national systems to adopt a
single efficient form. To be sure, the form on which systems would
converge differed depending on which national system appeared most
successful at the time of the prediction. Before the bursting of the
Japanese “bubble economy,” the main bank system represented the
future; this array of complementary governance institutions was
necessary to support lean manufacturing, the emerging standard of
efficient production.10 Not long thereafter, the Japanese bubble burst
and the American economy boomed – sustained growth, low
unemployment and, most surprisingly, low inflation – due to its rapid
response to global competition, stock market-centered capital market,
and the external monitoring to which stock markets are
complementary. The American system then became the apparent end
point of corporate governance evolution, a consensus that appears
clearly from the IMF and the World Bank’s response to the 19971998 East Asian financial crisis. In addition to these agencies’
traditional emphasis on macroeconomic matters like government
deficit reduction, countries accepting financial assistance also had to
commit to fundamental reform of their corporate governance system,
in the direction of the American model.11
available on the Social Science Research Network Electronic Library at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper.taf?ABSTRACT_ID=192549.
10

A good example is a collection of articles holding out the main bank system as a
model for emerging nations that came out of a World Bank financed study. See
Mashiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick, eds., The Japanese Main Bank System: Its
Relevance for Developing and Transforming Economies (1994).
11

See, e.g., Timothy Lane, et. al., IMF- Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea,
and Thailand 72-73 (Int’l Monetary Fund Occasional Paper No. 178, 1999); Asia
Pacific Talks Vow Tough Action on Economic Crisis, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26,
1997, p.A1; William A. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate
Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference,
38 J. Col. J.Transnat’l L. 213, 236 and 236n.68 (1999), catalogs European
proposals of U.S. style corporate governance reform proposals. Ronald Dore
recounts the same influence of U.S. influence in Japan:
What …all these slogans [concerning Japanese capital market reform]
add up to is a general belief that (1) the principles according to which
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These predictions of governance convergence had a more serious
problem than the conflict in their prophecies. National governance
systems turned out to be more adaptive in function, and therefore
more persistent in form, than the prophets of convergence expected.
For example, it was thought that Japanese lean production, supported
both by employees rendered cooperative and inventive by lifetime
employment, and by close, long-term ties to suppliers, could not be
matched without dramatic changes in U.S. governance institutions. In
fact, American manufacturers adopted lean production, but adapted
lean production to fit their governance institutions, rather than
adapting their institutions to lean production. As Charles Sabel has
perceptively stressed, the link between institutional form and
production technology was less tight than had been assumed.12 The
American system’s functional adaptivity proved to be greater than
expected, leaving institutional form largely intact. Thus, the debate
over convergence is not quite joined. Are we expecting a formal
convergence of legal rules, as Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman
argue has largely been achieved,13 or merely functional convergence
that operates behind a façade of local institutions?
the typical neoclassical economics textbooks say the economy works
are a priori correct principles, (2) those principles are best exemplified
in the American economy, (3) the rightness of those principles is
further confirmed by American success, and (4) Japan’s present plight
is not just a cyclical phenomenon and a debt-deflation hangover from
the bubble; it is the natural and wholly just retribution visited on
Japan for not following these principles.
Ronald Dore, Japan’s Reform Debate: Patriotic Concern or Class Interest? Or
Both?, 25 J. Japanese Stud. 65, 66 (1999). Annelise Riles reports that “[p]opular
conversation in Tokyo today” refers to the shift toward an American approach to
financial market structure as a “second occupation,” referring to the influx of
American ideas that accompanied the post-World War II occupation of Japan.
Annelise Riles, The Transnational Appeal of Formalism: The Case of Japan’s
Netting Law (working paper, Feb. 2000).
12

Charles Sabel, Ungoverned Production: An American View of the Novel
Universalism of Japanese Production Methods, Law and Economics Center
Working Paper, Columbia Law School
(Feb. 1996); Susan Helper, John
MacDuffie & Charles Sabel, The Boundaries of the Firm as a Design Problem, Law
and Economics Center Working Paper, Columbia Law School (Feb. 1997).
13

Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
in Are Corporate Governance Systems Converging (Jeffrey Gordon & Mark J. Roe,
eds., forthcoming 2000).
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In this article I want to examine the interplay of functional
adaptivity on the one hand, and institutional persistence or path
dependency on the other, that will influence whether such corporate
governance convergence as we observe will be formal or functional.14
Part I maps the intersection of adaptivity and path dependency where
institutional form and function collide. I then consider a range of
different outcomes that may result from the encounter. Part II
describes two settings, one historical and one speculative, where
convergence has been or would be functional rather than formal:
removing poorly performing senior management, and disarming
German co-determination. Part III takes up an example of the
instrumental use of formal tools to catalyze the breakdown of path
dependent barriers to functional convergence of German cross-holding
and block-holding patterns. Part IV considers a setting where efforts
at securing functional convergence without formal convergence have

14

For present purposes, my concern is to clarify the terms of the discussion. I am
not trying to resolve the debate over the extent to which changing economic forces
are sufficient to drive formally and functionally divergent systems together. On
this issue, Mark Roe and Lucian Bebchuk recently argued that path dependencies
driven by “sunk adaptive costs, complimentarities, network externalities,
endowment effects, and multiple optima” on the one hand, and by the self-interest
of those who benefit from existing structures on the other, may freeze the
institutions of particular countries in a noncompetitive pose. Lucian Ayre Bebchuk
& Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and
Governance, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127, 169 (1999). The self-interested fork of this
argument tracks Mancur Olson’s assessment that interest groups with a stake in
current institutions will support policies that shrink the size of the pie if they
protect the size of the groups’ pieces. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of
Nations (1982).
Alternatively, others lament that the relentless drive of
competition has already compromised the diversity of capitalist systems that
allowed the state to buffer individuals and local institutions from the forces of
competition. “[A]cclerated technological change, renewed price competition and the
globalization of financial markets have combined to produce a world economy in
which a premium seems to be placed on speed of reaction: on rapid product change
and an ability to cut costs fast. …The destruction or devaluation of national state
capacity under globalization discriminates against national economies that are
socially governed by politics at the national level.” Colin Crouch & Wolfgang
Streek, Introduction: The Future of Capitalist Diversity, in Political Economy of
Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and Diversity l (Colin Crouch &
Wolfgang Streek eds. 1997). As will be apparent from the balance of my
discussion, I expect the outcome to be a mixed bag of formal, functional and
hybrid convergence, with the particular outcome quite sensitive to local conditions.

6

proven more difficult: the persistent relation between venture capital
markets and stock market-centered capital markets. Part V takes up
the potential for careful transaction design to help bridge the gap
between formal and functional convergence through what I call
convergence by contract. Two techniques are developed. The first
provides accountability to investors through private governance
mechanisms imbedded in the design of the security rather than through
traditional public governance mechanisms such as investor voting or
capital market surveillance. The second picks up John Coffee’s recent
analysis of convergence through a particular contract – the stock
exchange listing agreement by which a foreign issuer submits to U.S.
stock exchange governance rules and, more important, elements of
U.S. securities regulation.15 Convergence by contract may have
particular saliency in those European countries whose governance
structures use techniques, like super-voting stock to preserve family
control, which American institutional investors find objectionable.
Finally, Part VI takes up a form of convergence that operates through
a hybrid of private and public ordering: The opportunity for
individual companies to choose their corporate governance structure
by selecting from the statutes offered by competing jurisdictions – the
U.S. race to the top/race to the bottom form of regulatory competition
that may have been introduced to the European Community by the
European Court of Justice decision in Centros.16
I. The Interaction of Adaptivity and Path Dependency.
The institutional characteristics of national corporate governance
institutions exhibit path dependency. Initial conditions, determined
by the accident of history or the design of politics, can set an
economy down a particular path. For example, the weakness of
American financial intermediaries, and important characteristics of
Japanese corporate governance including lifetime employment and
15

John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History; The Prospects for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance and It’s Implications, 93 Nov. U.L. Rev.
641 (1999).
16

European Court of Justice, March 9, 1999, C. 21/297.
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main bank relationships, find their origins not in considerations of
efficiency, but in the interplay of populism and federalism in the case
of the United States,17 and in the World War II and immediate postwar experience in the case of Japan.18 Indeed, the same outcome is
possible even within a single economy. The trajectories of two hightechnology industrial districts -- the continued success of California’s
Silicon Valley and the relative decline of Massachusetts’ Route 128 -owe much to the serendipitous presence of legal rules adopted in
California following statehood that became important 100 years
later.19 From those initial positions, efficiency considerations favor
the addition of new institutions whose contribution to the system
reflects not just their own incremental addition to output, but also the
resulting increase in output of existing institutions to which the new
institutions are complementary.20 For example, barriers to financial
intermediary participation in corporate governance find a complement
in legal rules and institutions that protect small shareholders who, in
the absence of large financial intermediaries, must provide an

17

Roe, supra note 3; see Simon, supra note 3.

18

See, e.g., Gilson & Roe, Lifetime Employment, supra note 4; Masahiko Aoki,
Unintended Fit: Organizational Evolution and Government Design of Institutions
in Japan, Center for Economic Policy Research Working Paper No. 434, Stanford
University (1994); Takeo Hoshi, Cleaning-up the Balance Sheets: Japanese
Experience in the Post-War Reconstruction Period, in Corporate Governance in
Transitional Economies: Insider Control and the Role of Banks 303 (Masahiko
Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim, eds. 1995); Tetsuji Okazaki The Japanese Firm under the
Wartime Planned Economy, 7 J.Jap. & Intn’l Econ. 175 (1993).
19

Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74,
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 595 (1999).
20

This increasing return characteristic is referred to as “supermodularity”. See Paul
Milgrom & John Roberts, Complementarities and Systems: Understanding
Japanese Economic Organization, 9 Estudios Econ*micos 3 (1994). Milgrom and
Roberts develop their analysis of how multi-attribute systems develop from an
initial starting point in Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Complementarities and Fit:
Strategy, Structure and Organizational Change in Manufacturing, 19 J. Acct’g &
Econ. 179 (1995); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, The Economics of Modern
Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy and Organization, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 511
(1990).
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economy’s investment.21 Similarly, the inability to protect trade
secrets embedded in human capital finds a complement in a labor
market characterized by extreme employee mobility.22 Such increasing
return characteristics shape the development path at each stage by
favoring the selection of new institutions that increase the output of
preexisting institutions, at the expense of alternatives that lack this
attribute. Thus, the corporate governance system’s development is
driven, domino-like, by the linking of complementary institutions.23
In this system of institutional complementarity, institutional
form is still constrained by the initial starting point, which under some
21

The reader will note that this formulation finesses an important current debate
between my colleagues Professors John Coffee and Mark Roe. Noting that recent
empirical work by financial economists has linked the existence of strong stock
markets not to U.S. populist politics as argued by Mark Roe, but to strong legal
protections for minority shareholders, Professor Coffee has put forward a “legal
theory” of capital market development that he contends better fits the evidence than
Professor Roe’s political theory. Thus, Professor Coffee states that “[t]he most
convincing explanation for this sharp disparity [between the importance of equity
markets in the U.S. and in France, Germany and Italy] is that only those legal
systems that provide significant protections for minority investors can develop
active equity markets. … But once this explanation is accepted, it amounts to a
rejection of the ‘political theory’ offered by Professor Roe and others.” Coffee,
supra n. 15, at 644 (1999). See John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate
Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure 25 J. Corp. L. 1 (1999).
Formulating the issue in terms of complementarity-driven institutional evolution
allows an important role for both politics and law. The difficulty with Professor
Coffee’s analysis is that it treats law as exogenous. If, as Professor Roe argues, the
absence of financial intermediaries was driven by politics, then the resulting
increased role for securities markets and individual investors creates a demand for
complementary protective law that would not be present in a system with large
financial intermediaries. From this prospective, law is important, but its character
– protective of minority shareholders or not – is shaped by politics, a result
consistent with the reported correlation between protective legal rules and developed
securities markets. Put differently, political conditions create the demand for
protective law, a combination that turns out subsequently to be efficient. Cf.
Gilson & Roe, Lifetime Employment, supra note 3 (lifetime employment was
politically dictated but then calls forth efficient complementary institutions). For
Professor Roe’s analysis of Professor Coffee’s criticism, see Mark J. Roe, Political
Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Control (working paper, September
1999). For the empirical literature that provides the foundation of Professor
Coffee’s analysis, see the sources listed in note 9 supra.
22

See Gilson, High Technology Industrial Districts, supra note 19.

23

Milgrom & Roberts, Complementarities and Systems, supra note 20.
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circumstances may cause problems. A complementary system is
difficult to change piecemeal; like leverage, complementarity has an
ominous downside. When external economic changes counsel altering
one institutional attribute, the change may cause the productivity of
the entire system to decline dramatically because other attributes were
selected to make good use of the now altered attribute.24 The
structure of the U.S. capital market, for example, represents the
efficiency driven development of complementary institutions given
the politically imposed initial condition. However, these same
institutions represent a barrier to change if altered economic
conditions reduce the resulting system’s efficiency.
Path dependency, however, is not the only force influencing the
shape of corporate governance institutions. Existing institutions are
subject to powerful environmental selection mechanisms. If existing
institutions cannot compete with differently organized competitors,
ultimately they will not survive.
Path dependent formal
characteristics of national governance institutions confront the
discipline of the operative selection mechanisms that encourage
functional convergence to the more efficient structure and, failing that,
formal convergence as well. National institutions are thus shaped by
what I have elsewhere called “corporate governance plate tectonics, in
which the demands of current circumstances grind against the
influence of initial conditions.”25 From this perspective, functional
convergence, in which the barriers to formal institutional change are
avoided, comes first. Formal convergence, which can involve ripple
like costs – including political costs – of changing complementary
institutions with their own economic and political constituencies,
comes as a last resort.26
24

Id.

25

Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency, supra note 8, at 332.

26

Of course, convergence of any sort may fail in the face of institutions too
inflexible for functional convergence and political institutions too responsive to the
blocking efforts of interest groups protecting existing arrangements for formal
convergence. Early 20th century Argentina appears to be such a failure, a then first
world country that devolved significantly beginning in the 1930s. See Mark J.
Roe, Backlash, 98 Col. L. Rev. 217 (1998).
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II. Functional but not Formal Convergence: Replacing Senior
Management
Recent empirical research concerning the German, Japanese and
American corporate governance systems illustrates the occurrence of
functional but not formal convergence.27 German and Japanese
corporate governance is said to be long-term oriented, so that
managers can ignore short-term swings in stock prices and accounting
profits in choosing projects.28 The long-term, multi-dimensional
relationship between banks and corporations in Germany and Japan
may provide the suppliers of capital better information concerning
corporate performance than stock price and accounting measures. 29 In
contrast, the American stock market centered system is said to
measure performance based largely on short-term oriented stock price
and accounting reports, so that managers must invest in projects that
provide short-term results clearly observable by one dimensional
stock market investors who have no other source of information.30
The institutional characteristics of all three systems –
strong financial intermediaries in the German and Japanese systems
and weak intermediaries in the American system – are path
dependent. 31 Little formal convergence has occurred. But whether
there has been functional convergence, that is, whether the formal
differences any longer affect performance, is empirically testable.
Any successful system must find a way to replace poorly performing
senior managers. If formal institutional characteristics matter, then the
27

This section elaborates on Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic
Efficiency, supra note 8.
28

See, e.g., Porter, supra note 7.

29

Jeremy Edwards & Klaus Fisher, Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany,
Ch. 2, sets out the argument.
30

Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. Pol. Econ. 61,
64-78 (1988), models such a process.
31

On this point, Professors Roe and Coffee appear to agree. Formal institutional
characteristics – for Roe, legislative barriers to the growth of financial
intermediaries, and for Coffee, legal rules that protect minority shareholders –
dictate the structure of capital markets. See Coffee, supra note 15, and Roe, supra
note 3.
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monitoring of managers should be dictated by the information made
available by the two systems. Because one can manage only what one
can measure, the tenure of American senior managers should be more
sensitive to short-term changes in stock price and accounting earnings
than that of German and Japanese managers; only short-term results
are said to be observable to U.S. capital providers, while German and
Japanese bank monitors receive sufficient information to evaluate
longer-run strategies.
Empirical studies demonstrate functional but not formal
convergence. Despite the striking differences in institutional form that
still remain among the three governance systems, we do not observe
the predicted differences among the three systems of monitoring
management. Rather, we observe functional convergence. Regardless
of whether the capital market is bank or stock market centered, the
tenure of senior management in all three countries is equally sensitive
to poor performance, whether measured by stock market returns or
accounting earnings.32 This functional convergence is driven by
selection: A system that allows poor managers to remain in control
will not succeed. We do not observe formal convergence because each
system’s governance institutions have sufficient flexibility to find a
solution within their path dependent limits. In the United States,
stock market information and external pressure drives the solution; in
Japan, main bank contingent monitoring is triggered by poor
performance;33 and in Germany, bank voting control and access to
internal information through supervisory board membership,34 are the
32

See Steven Kaplan, Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A
Comparison of Japan and the U.S., 102 J Pol. Econ. 510 (1994); Steven Kaplan,
Top Executive Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany, 10 J. L.Econ.& Org.
142 (1994); Jun-Koo Kang & Anil Shivdasani, Firm Performance, Corporate
Governance, and Top Executive Turnover in Japan, 38 J. Fin. Econ. 29 (1995);
Steven Kaplan & Bernadette Minton, Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese
Boards: Determinants and Implications for Managers, 36 J. Fin. Econ. 225 (1994).
33

Masahiko Aoki, Monitoring Characteristics of the Main Bank System: An
Analytical and Developmental View, in The Japanese Main Bank System: Its
Relevance for Developing and Transforming Economies (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh
Patrick, eds. 1994).
34

See, e.g., Helmut M. Dietl, Capital Markets and Corporate Governance in Japan,
Germany, and the United States 122-26 (1998).
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active forces. In each case, we do not observe convergence of
institutional form. Rather, each system’s particular response to the
problem of replacing poorly performing managers is, in evolutionary
theorist’s Stephen J. Gould’s terms, “jury-rigged from a limited set of
available components”35 supplied by the system’s particular history.
This analysis suggests a pattern: Functional convergence is likely
the first response to competitive pressure because changing the form
of existing institutions is costly. New institutions require new
investment, and existing institutions will have developed related
interest groups that render more difficult any necessary political
action.
Moreover, the threat of partial change to interest groups organized
around existing institutions is exacerbated by complementarity.
Mancur Olson stresses that focused interest group politics motivated
by protecting group welfare can block change that would be welfare
increasing for society at large, a phenomenon he argues importantly
influences the relative growth rate of nations.36 Changing the form of
an institution, in order to enhance its own efficiency in response to
changing economic conditions, initially may result in a reduction, not
an increase, in overall system productivity. The new form may not be
complementary to the other institutions that make up the system,
which can result in a reduction in the performance of even those
institutions whose form remains unchanged.
In a system
characterized by complementarity, it may be necessary to alter all
remaining complementary institutions before alteration of the first will
improve things. 37 The result, among other things, is to multiply the
number of interest groups with rents to protect. Functional changes
in existing institutions – in Gould’s terms again, “a contraption not a

35

Stephen J. Gould, The Panda’s Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History 20
(1980). Steven Kaplan & Mark Ramseyer, Those Japanese Firms with Their
Disdain for Shareholders: Another Fable for the Academy, 74 Wash. U.L.Q. 403
(1996), also stress the Japanese system’s capacity for functional convergence.
36

37

Olson, supra note 14.
Milgrom & Roberts, Complementarities and Systems, supra note 20.

13

lovely contrivance”38 – will often be the least cost means to respond
to economic change.39
A second example of functional change, as opposed to more
politically difficult formal change, involves the problem of reforming
labor participation on the supervisory boards of large German
corporations.40 Suppose one concludes that co-determination restricts
the ability of German corporations to adapt to global competition and
protects existing jobholders at the expense of higher unemployment.41
Further suppose that the political barriers to formal change −
legislative amendment of the relevant statute – are prohibitive at least
in the short to medium run. In this setting, one can imagine a
functional end run around the barriers to formal convergence,
disarming rather than eliminating co-determination.
Under existing legislation, shareholder selected supervisory
members, with the aid of the tie breaking vote cast by the chairman,
command a majority of the board.42 Thus, labor influence in the face
of a shareholder selected board majority may reflect a coalition
between inside managers and labor representatives unchallenged by
passive shareholder selected board members. 43 A functional response
to the problem might involve a shift in the character of the shareholder
38
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selected supervisory board members. Should the large German banks
conclude that the inflexibility created by the blocking alliance was too
costly, they might respond by reinventing shareholder selected
supervisory board members so that more active shareholder members
can disarm the blocking coalition.44 To be sure, labor may respond by
seeking further formal protection, but securing affirmative legislative
action is likely more difficult than blocking actions that would result
in formal convergence.
III. The Interaction of Formal and Functional Convergence
In some circumstances, path dependency reinforced by formal rules
presents a barrier to functional convergence. Large German banks and
insurance companies hold large stakes in other publicly held German
corporations and in each other.45 For example, Figure 1 shows the
pattern of cross-holdings among shareholders of Daimler-Benz.

[Figure One Here]

More generally, studies report substantial block holders in a very
high percentage of German public companies.46 Now suppose that
the economic environment changes in a fashion that requires a
systemic response that can best be affected through a stock market
centered capital market, rather than a bank centered capital market
characterized by large block holdings.47 While formal corporate law
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creates no barriers to the holders of large blocks reducing the size of
their positions, German tax law creates a substantial path
dependency. Sale of these stakes are subject to a 42 percent capital
gains tax (rate effective January 1, 2000) that enforces the path
dependent character of German concentrated ownership by imposing
a substantial tax on a redistribution of ownership.
In December 1999, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
proposed eliminating the capital gains tax on sales by German
corporations of stock in other German corporations, with the explicit
goal of eliminating barriers to dissipating concentrated crossholdings.48 This change in tax rules represents an interesting
interaction between formal and functional convergence. The proposed
tax cut – revenue neutral to the extent that the tax induced path
dependency prevented sales from ever being made – only eliminates
the institutional shadow of a low basis. Determination of the most
efficient distribution of shareholdings then is left largely to functional
convergence, affected by the institutions’ sales of their block-holdings
and cross-holdings.
IV. The Failure of Functional Convergence: Venture Capital
and the Structure of Capital Markets49
Comparisons of the United State’s capital market with those of
Japan and Germany focus on the different roles of banks and stock
markets. The United States has a large number of comparatively small
47
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banks that for practical purposes play no role in corporate
governance, and an advanced stock market that supports an active
market for corporate control catalyzed by the mechanism of hostile
takeovers. Japanese and German banks are few in number, but larger
in size relative to each nation’s industrial firms, and are said to play an
important governance role by monitoring corporate management.50
Neither country has an active market for corporate control.
Less attention is paid to an additional systematic difference
between bank and stock market-centered capital markets: the existence
of a much stronger venture capital industry in stock market centered
systems.51 Because an active venture capital market is said to be
critical to encouraging innovation, many countries have sought to
replicate the United States’ success. The failure of bank-centered
systems to develop comparable venture capital markets demonstrates
both the failure of functional convergence – banks have not been able
to alter their functions in a fashion that would duplicate the stock
market’s role in venture capital – and the difficulty of implementing
the systemic formal change necessary to the adaption of
complementary systems.
In another article, Bernard Black and I have explored the link
between stock markets and venture capital markets. The ability to
liquidate a portfolio company investment – to “exit” − is crucial to
venture capital investors. Their contribution to portfolio companies
consists of both cash and non-cash contributions, such as managerial
services, intensive monitoring and reputation, that are linked by
economies of scope. Once a portfolio company succeeds to the point
that the venture capitalist’s non-cash contributions are of reduced
50
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value, efficiency dictates recycling those inputs so they can be
invested in companies at a stage that requires them. However, the
economies of scope associated with linking cash and non-cash
contributions dictate recycling the cash contributions at the same time.
Hence the importance of exit.52
The particular type of exit is crucial to the entrepreneur and to the
terms of the contract between the venture capitalist and the
entrepreneur. When exit occurs through an initial public offering,
available only in a stock market-centered capital market, the
entrepreneur typically regains the disproportionate amount of control
that was shifted to the venture capitalist at the time of its investment,
even if, as is typically the case, the venture capitalist does not then
dispose of its entire investment. In contrast, when exit occurs by the
portfolio company’s sale to a third party, an exit route that is
available in bank-centered capital markets, the entrepreneur not only
forfeits the control ceded to the venture capitalist, but loses as well
the elements of control he had retained. The critical impact of the
opportunity to exit through an initial public offering is that, at the
time of the initial investment, the parties can enter into an implicit
contract that, in effect, gives the entrepreneur a call option on control
exercisable on the company’s success and reflected in the transaction
by the release of the venture capitalist’s formal levers of control on
the occurrence of a public offering. Because the incentive properties
of this implicit contract go to the heart of the entrepreneurial process
– that is, the entrepreneur’s dealings in control -- its availability only
in a stock market-centered capital market helps explain the absence of
vigorous venture capital markets in countries with bank-centered
capital markets.53
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Bank-centered systems could respond to this competitive
disadvantage through functional convergence: retain the structure of
the capital market but provide funding of innovation through bank
financing of start-up companies or internalization of the
entrepreneurial process by large companies. If these alternative
institutions yield the same functional performance as the United
States’ stock market linked venture capital market, then adaption will
have occurred through functional convergence without the need for
more costly formal convergence.
The empirical evidence needed to assess the existence of
functionally equivalent financing of innovation in bank-centered
systems is not available, but anecdotal evidence supports a skeptical
view. The United States has become a world leader in precisely those
industries, notably biotechnology and computer related high
technology, in which venture capital markets played a central role.
Moreover, large American and European pharmaceutical companies
are responding to innovation in biotechnology not by direct funding of
entrepreneurs, but by providing later stage financing and partnering to
entrepreneurial companies, mostly U.S. based and originally financed
through venture capital.54
A number of European countries have recognized the apparent
failure of functional convergence, and have made efforts at formal
convergence, notably by starting special stock exchange segments for
newer, smaller companies. The limited success to date highlights the
difficulty of piecemeal change of a system made up of complementary
institutions.
France and Germany first tried to create small company
stock markets during the 1980s; by the 1990s these projects had been
closed or marginalized.55 Current efforts include the Alternative
54
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Investment Market of the London Stock Exchange; Euro NM, a
consortium of the French Le Noveau MarchJ, the German Neur
Markt, and the Belgian New Market; and EASDAQ, an exchange
explicitly patterned after the U.S. NASDAQ, of which the NASD,
NASDAQ’s operator, is a part owner. The number of recent initial
public offerings, especially on the Neur Markt, is evidence of the
increasing acceptance of this institutional innovation.56 Recognition of
the importance of complementarity, however, suggests that merely
creating a stock market will be insufficient to provide the institutional
infrastructure necessary to support a venture capital market. Also
missing are the complementary institutions that developed from the
presence of stock markets in the United States: venture capital
organizations, the limited partner investment vehicle, investment
bankers experienced in taking early-stage companies public and, most
important, a supply of entrepreneurs which the availability of venture
capital financing elicits in the first place.

56
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One approach to the complementarity driven problem of
creating multiple institutions more or less simultaneously is made
available by the globalization of the capital market. As Bernard Black
and I have suggested, companies with bank-centered systems can
piggyback on another country’s existing institutions. In particular,
U.S. venture capital institutions – NASDAQ and its institutional
infrastructure, including venture capital investors, investment bankers
with experience in venture capital-backed IPOs, and experienced
lawyers and accountants – are available to European start-ups.
Access to these substitute institutions can facilitate adaption during
the period that local institutions develop to achieve formal
convergence.57
V. Convergence by Contract
Having examined situations where functional convergence has
succeeded and, alternatively, where formal convergence appears
necessary, the survey is extended by looking at a third situation that I
will call convergence by contract. 58 Here I have in mind convergence
in a situation where existing institutions lack the flexibility to achieve
functional convergence, but where the costs, especially the political
costs, of changing existing institutions make formal convergence
difficult. I take up first the possibility of convergence through
security design. I then consider convergence through the contract
associated with a foreign company’s listing its shares on a U.S. stock
exchange.
57
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A. Convergence Through Security Design.
American investors, especially large pension funds and other
institutional investors, now own substantial stakes in European
publicly traded corporations. For example, the California Public
Employees Retirement System (“CalPERS”), the largest U.S. public
retirement fund, holds nearly $20 billion in foreign equities,
representing almost 20 percent of its total investment in equity.59
Anglo-Saxon institutional investment of this sort translates into a
significant percentage of the outstanding shares in particular countries:
on average, 35 percent of the outstanding shares of the 40 largest
companies on the Paris stock exchange are held by American and
British institutional investors and pension funds.60 The figure rises to
41 percent of Dutch companies.61
With significant foreign investment has come demand for change in
European corporate governance systems. In Netherlands, France, and
Sweden, for example, substantial deviation from the Anglo-Saxon one
share-one vote model can protect incumbent managers from
monitoring by the capital market. Confronted with corporate
governance systems that appear to lack mechanisms for external
monitoring, U.S. institutional investors have begun to urge that
European companies make significant changes in their formal
governance institutions to more closely resemble U.S. style
governance. Leading the movement, CalPERS has announced a set of
general principles − its six General Principles including director
accountability to shareholders and a one share-one vote capital
structure. The General Principles were followed with the issuance of
specific standards for the United Kingdom, France, Germany and
Japan. 62
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Formal convergence of continental corporate governance to the
U.S. model can be expected to be very difficult, especially when it
comes to matters of corporate control. Unequal voting regimes are
designed to protect family control (and in the Netherlands foundation
control); broadly weakening that control by amending the corporate
statute to restrict unequal voting would face formidable political
barriers. Some potential for finding a way out of the conflict between
the institutional investors’ demand for formal mechanisms of
accountability, and the Europeans’ sensitivity to relinquishing formal
elements of control, arises from a kind of convergence that has taken
place in the United States. The simple fact is that U.S. institutional
investors do not always demand the same formal governance structure
from all entities in which they invest. Such investors, including
CalPERS, happily place billions of dollars annually in entities that
lack the governance mechanisms traditionally found in U.S. public
corporations. These investments go into the private equity market
through the vehicle of a limited partnership in which the investors give
up traditional governance mechanisms in return for securing the
specialized services of the general partner in making investments in
non-publicly traded securities.63
Investors in such vehicles as venture capital limited partnerships
and leveraged buyout funds are not, however, left unprotected from
the familiar host of agency problems against which traditional
corporate governance techniques are directed. Rather, they are
protected by quite different mechanisms that are created by contract.64
While tracing the overall governance structure of these investment
63
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vehicles is not my purpose here, examination of one feature is
illustrative.
A standard private equity limited partnership has a fixed life,
typically ten years, after which the partnership must be liquidated
and its assets returned to investors. This fixed termination serves a
number of important purposes. Most important, it balances the
general partner’s need for discretion in making illiquid investments
characterized by enormous uncertainty, with the investors need for a
mechanism of accountability. In publicly held corporations misuse of
free cash flow is policed internally by the board of directors, and
externally through shareholder action either through voting or through
the control market, in all cases illuminated by performance
information provided through stock market prices. In private equity
limited partnerships, the free cash flow problem is addressed by a
requirement that the general partner distribute the proceeds of
investments that become liquid, and by the requirement that the
partnership terminate and the assets be returned to investors at the
end of the partnership term. These features assure that the general
partner will not retain indefinitely capital which it cannot invest
profitably.
The need to liquidate the partnership’s assets to facilitate
distribution also provides an observable measure against which to
weigh the general partner’s performance. Prior to that point, a market
measure of the value of the limited partnership’s portfolio is not
available because its private equity investments are not liquid.
Finally, forced liquidation operates to hold the general partner
accountable for its performance. At the end of the partnership term,
the investor has the opportunity to choose whether to allow the
general partner to continue managing its money by choosing whether
to invest in a new limited partnership formed by the general partner.
The general partner then must compete with other managers for the
opportunity to manage the money of investors in the liquidated
partnership, with its prior performance being the central influence on
the outcome.
In countries where the cost of formal convergence would be high
because of family and other concentrated holdings, accountability to
investors might still be achieved by use of these private equity
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investment techniques. While designing a security by which this
could be accomplished is well beyond my ambitions here, imagine that
a European company with dual class voting in which a family controls
the super voting shares, desires to raise equity capital from U.S.
institutional investors. The family, however, is unwilling unilaterally
to cede its control to the public float by eliminating the dual class
structure.
An institutional investor might well be reluctant to invest when
the dual class capital structure blocks any external monitoring of the
performance of the management chosen by the controlling shareholder.
Suppose instead the institutional investor is offered an equity security
that provides accountability by mimicking the fixed term of a private
equity investment, a correspondence that makes sense because both
publicly traded corporations with dual class capital structures and
private equity limited partnerships lack traditional corporate
governance accountability mechanisms.
The structure of the security could take a number of forms. For
example, the institutional investor could be sold low voting stock
which, at the end of specified periods, would become super voting if
the company’s performance did not meet a specified standard,
perhaps a designated percentile among a group of peer companies. If
the voting shift were triggered, family designated management would
have to compete for the opportunity to continue to manage the
company. Depending on the size of the investment, actual control of
the company might shift. Alternatively, the security might provide
put rights that guaranteed the investor a return keyed to peer group
performance; the need to raise capital to fund performance of a puttriggered redemption would have the same disciplining effect.
This short account provides not even a checklist of the provisions
such a security would require, nor even a thoughtful canvas of what
types of securities might be devised.65 For now, the task is much
more limited. I mean only to sketch the outlines of an intermediate
65
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contractual approach to convergence that might be appropriate when
existing governance institutions lack the flexibility necessary for
functional convergence and the mutability necessary for formal
convergence.
B. Convergence Through Stock Exchange Listing.
John Coffee has developed a second example of convergence by
contract, less speculative than the arbitrage between private and
public organizational forms developed in Section V.A., and with the
advantage of being already visible.66 In this case, the contract is the
listing agreement executed when a non-U.S. corporation lists its
securities on a U.S. securities exchange, together with those U.S.
securities laws to which the act of listing subjects a foreign
corporation.
The listing agreement itself imposes a set of governance
obligations including a minimum number of independent directors, an
audit committee, and an equal opportunity rule with respect to tender
offers. In turn, by listing on a U.S. stock exchange, the foreign
company is obligated to register under Section 12(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, thereby voluntarily subjecting itself to a host
of U.S. securities regulations that have corporate governance
implications.
For example, by listing on a U.S. exchange a foreign company
accepts the obligation under Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to disclose holders of more than five percent of its
outstanding stock, a significantly more stringent trigger than the 10
percent threshold required by the European Union Transparency
Directive. The company also accepts the rules under Section 14(d)
governing the procedural and substantive aspects of tender offers,
those under Section 13(e) governing going private transactions, and
those under Section 13(b) governing the making of “questionable
payments.” To be sure, the SEC has allowed some exemptive relief
for foreign issuers when the detail of a particular requirement is
inconsistent with the law of a foreign company’s home jurisdiction,67
but the scope of governance rules adopted by the act of listing and the
resulting application of the Securities Exchange Act is significant.
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VI. Hybrid Convergence through Regulatory Competition
Convergence by contract through foreign companies voluntarily
listing their securities on U.S. exchanges is made possible by a form of
regulatory competition. By choosing a U.S. listing, a foreign company
selects a significant element of U.S. governance rules in preference to
those of its own jurisdiction. A similar convergence mechanism has
always been available in the United States with respect to corporate
law. Because in the United States a corporation’s internal affairs
(including especially its corporate governance) is governed by its state
of incorporation without regard to its principal place of business, a
U.S. corporation can choose the state corporate law that governs its
affairs by choosing its state of incorporation.68 The aggregated choices
of a majority of publicly traded U.S. corporations have resulted in a
convergence on the Delaware General Corporation Law as a de facto
national corporate law.
Historically, convergence through regulatory competition was not
available in Europe because the widespread application of the “real
seat” doctrine dictated that the corporate law of the country in which
the corporation’s principal place of business was located governed its
internal affairs regardless of the country of incorporation, a mandatory
coincidence of a company’s primary business location and the
corporate law covering its governance.69 At the margin, differences in
corporate governance simply did not outweigh the real economic
differences that grew our of a business’ location, especially before the
single market initiative. As a result, Europe has supported a wide
variety of corporate law regimes, ranging from the U.K.’s AngloSaxon system to the German dual board, and codetermined system.
On March 9, 1999, this equilibrium of diverse corporate regimes
was fundamentally destabilized. In its Centros decision70, the
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European Court of Justice introduced regulatory competition – a
hybrid between formal and functional convergence – into the
European Union.
In Centros, Danish residents seeking to organize a corporation to
do business in Denmark attempted to avoid the 200,000 Danish
Crown (approximately $27,000) minimum capital requirement by
organizing a U.K. corporation. English corporate law was attractive
because it did not impose a minimum capital requirement for private
corporations.71 The newly formed U.K. corporation, which did not,
and was never intended to do business in the U.K., then applied for
registration (i.e., qualification to do business in U.S. terms) in
Denmark.
The Danish Registry Office refused registration, concluding, quite
accurately, that the U.K. incorporation was merely a means to avoid
the Danish minimum capital requirement.72 The European Court of
Justice, however, relying upon the rights of establishment in Articles
52 and 58 of the Treaty, protected forum shopping for favorable
corporate law by decoupling the choice of where to incorporate from
the choice of where to locate the corporation’s business operations:
[T]he fact that a national of a Member State who
wishes to set up a company chooses to form it in
the Member State whose rules of company law
seem to him the least restrictive and to set up
branches in other Member States cannot, in itself,
constitute an abuse of the right of establishment.
The right to form a company in accordance with the
law of a Member State and to set up branches in
other Member States is inherent in the exercise, in a
single market, of the freedom of establishment
guaranteed by the Treaty.73
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Understandably, Centros created “great waves of unrest on the
continent.”74 But it also created a hybrid mechanism of convergence –
formal in the sense that what is at issue is the selection of binding
rules of corporate law, but functional in the sense that, as a result of
the European Court of Justice's decision, European Community law is
sufficiently flexible to allow at least newly formed companies to
adapt their governance structures in response to changing economic
conditions.
The hybrid of formal and functional convergence Centros makes
possible can be illustrated by the choices facing a venture capitalist
and a German entrepreneur seeking to make use of German
engineering and scientific talent to organize a high technology start-up
company.
Formal German corporate law presents two particular problems for
the standard venture capital contract used to finance early-stage high
technology businesses.75 Central to the relationship between the
investor and the entrepreneur is that, during the period prior to the
investors’ exit, the investor receives a level of control
disproportionate to its equity ownership.
In particular,
representatives of the venture capitalist often will control a majority
of the board of directors even if the VC puts up less than a majority
of the equity. Moreover, the board, controlled or significantly
influenced by the venture capitalist, can remove senior management,
including the founding entrepreneur, essentially at will.76 German
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corporate law – in particular co-determination and the rules governing
removal of management board members – present a barrier to giving
the venture capitalist the control dictated by the nature of early-stage
high technology financing.
First, fast-growing high technology companies can reach 500
employees very quickly, thereby triggering the full co-determination
requirement that one-half the supervisory board be composed of labor
representatives.77 Since the entrepreneur can be expected to require at
least some supervisory board representation, co-determination makes
majority control by the venture capital investors impossible. Second,
the requirement of a dual board structure further attenuates venture
capitalist control. Under German corporate law, the management
board is made up of full-time company employees, who cannot be
removed except for cause short of their five-year term.78 As a result,
the formal legal rule interferes with central features of the control
allocation critical to early-stage high technology financing.
Centros invites German venture capitalists and entrepreneurs to
select a jurisdiction whose corporate law is more favorable to venture
capital contracting – say, the U.K. – and then register the newly
formed corporation in Germany. The ability to choose a different law
allows functional convergence without altering formal German
corporate law by, in effect, making optional the undesirable features
of German law.
To be sure, the extent to which Centros actually announces a
regimen of regulatory competition is more complicated than to this
point I have allowed. First, some European lawyers have read
Centros narrowly, “merely referring to a case of abuse, without
general significance.”79 From the perspective of an American, and
therefore of an amateur at parsing the opinions of the European Court
of Justice, so narrow an interpretation seems like wishful thinking.
For better or worse, the Court explicitly ruled that denying branch
registration to a company whose foreign incorporation has the sole
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purpose of “evading application of the rules governing the formation
of companies” in the nation in which the company’s principal place
of business will be located, “is contrary to Articles 52 and 58.”80
Rather than responding to a case of abuse by a member state, the ECJ
seems self-consciously to invite avoidance by those organizing
businesses.81
Second, the effect of Centros may be attenuated by responsive
efforts by EC member states to impose restrictions in ways that
cannot be avoided by instrumental choice of where to incorporate.
Centros quite clearly limits its application to “rules governing the
formation of companies;” it does not apply to more general rules
“concerning the carrying out of certain trades, professions or
businesses.”82 Put differently, rules of general application, which do
not depend for their application on the member state under whose
laws a corporation was organized, would seem to be unaffected by
Centros. So, for example, Centros would allow a newly formed UK
corporation with a principal place of business in Germany to avoid
co-determination, but would not affect the application of German
legislation imposing workers councils on all companies. Thus, the
European Court of Justice has left open to EC members the strategy
of replacing worker participation in decision making imposed by
corporate law through the formal structure of the corporation, like codetermination and protection of management board tenure, with
legislation requiring worker participation before specified actions, like
plant closings, can be taken – a mandate framed as a matter of labor
relations, not corporate law.
At least in the high technology area, however, there is reason to
doubt whether EC member states, and especially Germany, will take
up the Court’s suggestions for crafting a way around Centros. First,
Centros shifts the burden of going forward with reform through the
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political system from those who favor reducing worker involvement
to those who wish to preserve it. Accomplishing change is more
difficult than merely having to protect the status quo.83 Second, there
is reason to believe that practical limits on the breadth of Centros’
application will persuade the labor movement that the game of
legislative reform to avoid the decision’s impact is not worth the
candle.
As written, Centros applies only to newly formed corporations –
quite literally, it affects the allocation of decision-making between
capital and labor only at the margin. It is not farfetched to imagine
that labor, anxious to increase German penetration of the high
technology industries and, hence, German employment, might not
object to a reduced governance role for labor in new companies in high
technology industries, especially if labors’ governance role in
established German industry remains unchanged.84
But what of efforts by existing large German companies to take
advantage of Centros? Suppose an existing company sought to relieve
itself of its two-tier board structure and co-determination by merging
into a newly formed U.K. subsidiary. 85 Would Centros require
Germany to register the new UK company, thereby extending
Centros to any company willing to reincorporate abroad, including
established German companies, and likely inciting a political response
by labor if it is to retain any formal corporate governance role?
At least for now, two barriers – one based in corporate law and the
other in tax law -- make it unlikely that the ECJ will extend Centros
to Germany’s traditional industrial base. The corporate law barrier
83
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concerns the merger: under German corporate law, a German
corporation cannot merge with a non-German corporation. The
convoluted structure of the recent Daimler-Benz/Chrysler
combination was necessitated to avoid just this barrier.86 To be sure,
one can readily craft an argument that legal rules which prevent the
migration of companies from one member state to another also violate
the Treaty’s right of establishment. But that holding would require a
substantial expansion of Centros, in practical effect from a decision
allowing functional convergence at the margins of a member state’s
economy, to one that contemplates regulatory competition as a means
of securing uniformity fully parallel to the Treaty based
harmonization through directive.87
Even were the ECJ to expand the reach of Centros, a
significant tax barrier would remain. Under German tax law, shifting
nation of incorporation is treated as a liquidation, thus triggering
corporate level capital gains tax on the appreciation in corporate
assets. For large German corporations, it is difficult to imagine that
the value of the more attractive governance features of the corporate
law of another EC member state would be worth the tax cost of the
shift. 88
V. Conclusion
In this essay, I have surveyed three kinds of corporate governance
convergence: functional convergence, when existing governance

86

Theodor Baums, Corporate Contracting Around Defective Regulations: The
Daimler-Chrysler Case, 155 J.Instit. & Theo. Econ. 119, 122 (1999).
87

This point is emphasized by the fact that in 1998 the European Commission
prepared a draft 14th directive that set out how shift in country of incorporation
could be effected. Wymeersch, supra note 71, at 16. Additionally, the European
Court of Justice’s decision in the Daily Mail case, C. 81/87 [1988] ERC 5483,
involving the transfer of the registered office of a company from one state to
another, is said to stand for the proposition “that articles 52 and 58 do not allow
companies to transfer their seat… .” Id. at 18. Interestingly, Daily Mail is not
cited by the Court in Centros.
88

One might suppose that the European Court of Justice could extend Centros to
prohibit imposing a tax penalty on the decision to shift nation of incorporation, but
here the boundaries of the argument begins to expand exponentially.

33

institutions are flexible enough to respond to the demands of changed
circumstances without altering the institutions’ formal characteristics;
formal convergence, when an effective response requires legislative
action to alter the basic structure of existing governance institutions;
and contractual convergence, where the response takes the form of
contract because existing governance institutions lack the flexibility to
respond without formal change, and political barriers restrict the
capacity for formal institutional change. Additionally, two forms of
hybrid convergence, involving voluntary selection of different formal
rules offered by other jurisdictions both within and without the
European Union, were considered. The diversity of circumstances
suggests that there can be no general prediction of the mode that
convergence of national corporate governance institutions may take.
Because the flexibility of governance and political institutions will
differ not only between countries, but within individual countries
based on the particular response called for by changed conditions, the
most we can predict is substantial variation both across and within
different national systems, what Stephen J. Gould called “a
contraption not a lovely contrivance.” 89
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